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The paper uses game theory to model interactions between a "Principal" (the watcher) and an "Agent" (the watched). The key insight is that while surveillance increases the probability of catching bad behavior, it simultaneously lowers the cost of reputation for the agent. If the agent feels they are not trusted, they feel less obligated to maintain a reputation for trustworthiness, leading to a breakdown in cooperation.